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ABSTRACT: This paper is about the relevance of the ineffable and the singular to herme-
neutics. I respond to standard criticisms of Friedrich Schleiermacher by Karl Barth and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer in order to clarify his understanding of language, interpretation, 
and religion. Schleiermacher’s “indicative hermeneutics” is developed in the context 
of the ethical signifi cance of communication and the ineffable. The notion of trace is 
employed in order to interpret the paradox of speaking about that which cannot be 
spoken. The trace is not a brute singularity but bears a fundamental relationship to 
the word—and ultimately the word of God—for Schleiermacher.
“Wer sich zu einem bestimmten Wesen bilden will, dem muss der Sinn geöffnet 
sein für Alles was er nicht ist.”—Friedrich Schleiermacher, Monologen (M).1
1. LANGUAGE AND THE INEFFABLE
According to Schleiermacher, in lecture 17 of the Dialectic of 1811 (DAP), “The deity is just as surely incomprehensible as the knowledge of it is the 
basis of all knowledge. Exactly the same is true also on the side of feeling.”2 It can 
well be asked how a relation to the incomprehensible is the basis of comprehen-
sion and further how a relation to the ineffable is the opening of the possibility 
of communication (Mitteilung) and language (Sprache). Yet in On Religion: 
Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (UR),3 and in other early writings, this is 
what Schleiermacher suggested. This possibility of relating to the nonrelational 
in feeling and intuition, of articulating the traces4 of the infi nite that interrupt 
the closure of fi nitude and immanence, suggests the limits and possibilities of 
hermeneutics understood as interpretation through discourse and language.5
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Schleiermacher defi ned hermeneutics as the art of understanding. As such, 
hermeneutics is an art, concerned with language, through which we interpret 
more than texts and indirectly understand others. This art has three levels: (1) the 
everyday use of language, (2), the skilled use of language, and (3) the refl ective 
use of language. Although hermeneutics is concerned with understanding, it is 
so only through language. Consequently, according to Schleiermacher: “Language 
is the only presupposition in hermeneutics, and everything that is to be found, 
including the other objective and subjective presuppositions, must be discovered 
in language.”6 In his earlier work On Religion, Schleiermacher is also concerned 
with language. The language of religion is fundamentally communication or Mit-
teilung (UR, 11) just as in The Christian Faith (CG) the philosophy of religion 
is the phenomenological investigation of the forms of religious community and 
consciousness.7 Yet religion demands a certain kind of communication as it does 
a particular form of community. Religion involves a communication about that 
which resists and withdraws from cognitive and theoretical knowledge, that which 
cannot be expressed in communication and yet demands a response in speech 
(UR, 11). Because the human disposition is fundamentally addressed (UR, 15) 
and attuned in feeling, it is called on to respond.
As Dilthey remarked in his work Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutical System 
in Relation to Earlier Protestant Hermeneutics of 1860 (HSH),8 not only 
is hermeneutics essentially concerned with language but language itself has a 
hermeneutical character from the beginning (HSH, 745) and, therefore, herme-
neutics shares the structure—both the limits and possibilities—of language. If 
language is always already related to what cannot be said, then the incommuni-
cable occurs as a limit and condition for hermeneutical understanding which 
cannot be sublimated and thus positively defi nes the tasks of interpretation. The 
object of understanding demands to be understood from out of itself (UR, 28) 
and accordingly that the one addressed be receptive to the claim being made.9 
The further claim that hermeneutics is the art of understanding better than the 
author understands himself indicates the need in interpretation to consider the 
unthought of an author (HSH, 707).
Human life occurs through communication which is always interpretation. 
Even what is most basic to Schleiermacher’s theological thought—God, Christ, and 
the Holy Spirit—calls for interpretation. The Holy Spirit or divine inspiration also 
involves an interpretive activity (HHM, 67) even in its fundamental receptivity or 
responsiveness. Both the revealed word and the preached word inherently call for 
human activities of interpretation in regard to that which is beyond and poten-
tially transforms human language and understanding. Karl Barth objected that 
this thesis undermines the ancient doctrine of divine inspiration—why should 
God not be able to make the divine word transparent (Barth, 183)? According to 
the logic of Schleiermacher’s argument, however, Barth’s counterclaim presup-
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poses that it is actually an option to replace interpretation with inspiration (i.e., 
the human with the divine), and that Christians can do without the interpretive 
event which addresses and calls forth a human response—and thus interpreta-
tion—to the divine in feeling and language.
For Schleiermacher, the religious word speaks fi rst of all to feeling and dis-
position. What moves us in feeling demands to be articulated and clarifi ed (CG, 
23). Moreover, insofar as thinking intends to be a knowing, it strives to be com-
municated (DAP, 56). Communication is the only means through which humans, 
as beings who think, feel, and act, can partially come to self-knowledge. However, 
human knowledge is more than simply incomplete. Knowing occurs in relation 
to an infi nity of differences, according to his Dialectic of 1814/15 (D, 24–25),10 
and to the incomprehensible in the lectures on dialectic of 1811 (DAP, 31). 
Therefore, the ineffable can be said to function in this discourse in two ways: (1) 
the infi nite that can never be fi nitely determined whether as a universal concept 
or a particular thing and (2) the singular that both discloses and conceals itself 
in discourse such that it can never be fully brought to language.
2. THE LIMITS OF HERMENEUTICS AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT
Schleiermacher has been criticized by Gadamer and others11 for limiting 
hermeneutics to a doctrine of art (Kunstlehre) oriented according to the idea of 
understanding correctly given the universality of misunderstanding.12 According 
to Gadamer, Schleiermacher missed the philosophical dimension of hermeneutics 
in which understanding is to be interpreted ontologically as the way humans are in 
the world and in a tradition. Schleiermacher consequently oriented hermeneutics 
as a doctrine of art to a false scientifi c idea of method and took understanding 
to aim at correctness rather than the disclosure of the happening of truth. The 
idea of correctness introduced a false emphasis on psychological interpretation 
in which the interpreter attempts to identify with the author’s psychology rather 
than with the truth of what the author claims.
However, Gadamer’s critique is in danger of confl ating the difference between 
art and science. As with Kant, the practice of art is not the doctrine of science nor 
does art deductively or mechanically apply rules and method.13 Art can never be 
solely based on rules, since this would involve the infi nite regress of always needing 
another rule to apply a rule. Art then requires judgment or a sense of appropriate 
application that is cultivated. Kant makes this distinction clear in the Critique of 
Judgment: Whereas science demands determinate judgment, which subsumes 
a particular under a concept, art calls for refl ective judgment, which articulates 
the general from the particular—that is, without a pregiven rule.14
For Schleiermacher, art is not the imposition of science onto tradition or system 
onto the life-world. Art originates in ordinary experience itself. It is always already 
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at work in ordinary understanding (HHM, 49) to the degree that even the child 
is engaged in the art of hermeneutics in language acquisition (HHM, 52). Art is 
practiced by a fi nite sensuous being because there is no rule for how to apply a 
rule. Method alone is insuffi cient for both Schleiermacher and Dilthey, since it is 
the cultivation of a sense already at work in everyday communication and as such 
it requires lived experience (HSH, 605).15 Although the goal of scientifi c correct-
ness is an important one in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, as Dilthey noted, art 
and imagination characterize all knowing (HSH, 695). Cognitive representation is 
necessary for the work of the sciences. Yet it is not itself primary since it is always 
based on prior feeling. Schleiermacher is consequently already engaged in a cri-
tique of a purely representational model of knowledge. Schleiermacher insisted on 
the priority of feeling in understanding the human agent and, as we shall see, the 
receptivity and responsiveness of the imagination in interpreting others through 
their expressions. In this sense, one of the strengths of “romantic hermeneutics” 
is that it recognizes the role of feeling, desire, and eros in interpretation.16
The emphasis on psychological understanding is subsequently not so much 
representational reproduction demanding correctness as it is a receptivity to the 
traces of the singularity of the other as they are indicated in communication.17 
As Dilthey argued in his reading of Schleiermacher, the individual and the sin-
gular would be lost in a discourse that denies the possibility of psychological 
interpretation (HSH, 717–718). The potential loss of this dimension in Gadamer 
and contemporary hermeneutics does not necessarily constitute a progress from 
epistemology to ontology. This advance forgets the question of the singular that 
ought to be central to hermeneutical understanding.
Although hermeneutics is universal as a universal doctrine of art applicable 
to all forms of communication, Schleiermacher failed to achieve the universal-
ity of hermeneutics (as understanding) demanded by Gadamer in the wake of 
Heidegger’s groundbreaking analysis of understanding as our way of being in the 
world. Gadamer’s criticisms are only partially answerable based on the resources 
of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical writings, since the word hermeneutics did 
not achieve a universal employment in Schleiermacher’s thought. It remained of 
limited scope in that philosophy and human existence are not to be identifi ed 
with what is gained through hermeneutics.
There is a crucial difference in aims between the hermeneutics of Gadamer 
and Schleiermacher. For Gadamer, hermeneutics should integrate rather than 
reconstruct and thus follow Hegel’s rather than Schleiermacher’s example (TM, 
165–169). There are at least two problems with this contrast: (1) Schleiermacher’s 
approach is not an “external reconstruction” but is receptivity to what addresses 
and claims us; and (2) Schleiermacher also noted the integrating and mediating 
character of language. Although he emphasized the unifying and conforming 
power of language and tradition, Schleiermacher also showed the importance of 
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linguistic transformation such as in the artist of language who each time individu-
alizes language anew (HHM, 49) and in the language forming power of the new 
and the individual.18 Although it is surely appropriate to be wary of the exaggerated 
claims of genius found in romantic aesthetics, which Gadamer analyzed so well, 
this suspicion or disenchantment of the different, individual, and singular ignores 
their potential disruptive or transformative power.19 Schleiermacher’s approach 
to language emphasized the differences that occur in relation to the identity of 
language; that is, with that which differentiates languages and, further, resists and 
withdraws from linguistic mediation. Hermeneutics concerns language, which is 
the only presupposition and defi nes the scope of hermeneutics (HHM, 50), but 
language cannot close itself to what is other than language in a pure immanence 
of linguistic integration or mediation. Despite the limits that language and thus 
hermeneutics might impose, these limits cannot eliminate the infi nity of sense 
(HHM, 53), the infi nite signifi cance of a book such as the Bible (HHM, 55), or 
the relation of the fi nite to the infi nite. The incommunicable confronts language 
both on the side of the whole and the individual.
Jean Grondin has emphasized the quest for the whole understood as com-
pleteness in romantic hermeneutics.20 Yet the whole is not so much a complete 
system as it is an infi nity of intercrossing relations that are ultimately referred 
to the non-relational. Along these lines, Dilthey characterized three senses of 
“whole” in Schleiermacher’s thought: (1) organizing inner form, (2) system, and 
(3) relational context or Zusammenhang (HSH, 679). Whereas organic inner 
form refers to an immanent teleology and the idea of a system points to the 
completeness of a totality, Zusammenhang indicates the contextuality which 
is interpreted as singularity in relation to infi nity. If there is a common quest in 
romantic hermeneutics, it is characterized more by the question of the singular 
and the ineffable than it is by the systematic completeness of representational 
knowledge. Dilthey could therefore suggest that individuality is the form of the 
whole (HSH, 709) and if we could know the whole, then we would know the whole 
in its concrete singularity rather than as a universal or concept.
Gadamer’s criticisms are thus answerable if we turn to Schleiermacher’s 
larger philosophical project in its hermeneutical signifi cance. The debate between 
traditional and universal hermeneutics is not so much about the correctness 
of Gadamer’s criticisms but, more signifi cantly, about the nature and tasks of 
hermeneutics itself. Schleiermacher did not name his larger philosophical project 
hermeneutics and yet it is hermeneutical in the sense that it does refl ect a funda-
mental concern with the scope and limits of understanding and communication 
between individuals and communities. This might be thought to be more prop-
erly hermeneutics, given the tradition as a whole beyond its twentieth-century 
appropriation, since it is directed both at questions of self and other as well as 
language and the ineffable.21
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If Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics emphasized the correctness of an under-
standing to be guided by the theoretical articulation of an art and practice, this 
is far from meaning that he presupposed correctness as the sole model of truth, 
since interpretation calls for responsive feeling and imagination. Nor does this 
imply that the world is inherently and fully comprehensible and intelligible, since 
as fi nite beings we relate to the infi nite through what Schleiermacher called in 
various places traces and seeds (Spuren und Keime). The notion of trace—de-
veloped in the works of Levinas and Derrida—is helpful for interpreting its use in 
Schleiermacher and the paradox of speaking about that which cannot be spoken. 
The trace is that which is given as not being able to be given, the presence of that 
which cannot be thought as presence, the disclosure of non-disclosedness, the 
revelation of that which is concealed as concealed. However, the trace does not 
stand alone as a brute singularity or fact, since it bears a fundamental relationship 
to the word—and ultimately the word of God—for Schleiermacher.
Further, Schleiermacher’s denial of truth as correctness and as system charac-
terized his confrontation with the Idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Instead 
of the purity of knowledge, Schleiermacher asserted in his Dialectic of 1814/15 
an infi nite difference (D, 24–25), criticizing such idealism for the sake of the in-
dividual (D, 35). The individual is not characterized by freedom or spontaneity 
alone, as it was for many of his contemporaries, but also by relative and absolute 
dependence.22 This dependence suggests a fundamental receptivity that deter-
mines how humans are in the world and their being toward that which is outside 
the human world (CG, 19–20). Insofar as this dependence is not a mere passive 
dependency, it involves some sort of activity. Dependence requires namely the ac-
tivity of a receptivity—which Schleiermacher sometimes described as a minimal 
point of activity—that is claimed by and responds to that which is indicated in 
the feeling of dependence. Since this receptivity is not simply an effect of a cause 
or a pure dependency, it would be appropriate to use the word “responsiveness” 
to describe it.23 The responsiveness of the feeling of absolute dependence in faith, 
which is neither purely active nor passive, parallels the responsive feeling of life 
in Kant’s Critique of Judgment.24
As a fundamental feeling, dependence is non-representational. It cannot simply 
be thought in concepts. It reveals itself instead in feeling, which is prior to and the 
basis of knowledge (OG, 40),25 and is understood as being-moved by something 
that is other than oneself (CG, 10). Human motility is rooted in the capacity to 
be moved, human receptiveness in feeling and thought is made possible in being 
addressed, such that human life is a response to and participates in the divine.
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is thus in a sense “limited” or, more precisely, 
“indicative.” For Schleiermacher, language is not exhausted in reference but opens 
up in expression, indication, performance, and suggestion. In the Speeches and 
the Monologen, Schleiermacher developed a language of indication (Andeutung) 
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which emphasized the indirect approach to that which cannot be directly referred 
to or said. This “hermeneutics” of indication, which was at work before he made 
his hermeneutics explicit, allows us to rethink the hermeneutical import of his 
thought. Schleiermacher’s mature hermeneutics, which retained the importance of 
the individual and the community by distinguishing psychological and linguistic 
interpretation, needs to be articulated in relation to its context from which we 
can draw out the hermeneutical import of his philosophy.
Language is fundamentally communication. As communication, language is 
both already ethical and already tied to that which can never be fully brought to 
language—the infi nite. Schleiermacher suggested in his On Religion that com-
munication arises as a need from our experience of the traces of the infi nite and 
the ineffable in our non-representational experience—namely, in feeling. In the 
early chapters of his later theological treatise The Christian Faith, Schleierm-
acher articulated how the feeling of piety cannot be explained as an intentional 
relation to an object (CG, 8–9). Rather than being a mere transmission of informa-
tion, communication is in both works that which binds addresser and addressee. 
Still, how can one speak of address in the case of the ineffable and infi nite? How 
are we spoken to in and through the faith—the faith that Schleiermacher defi ned 
early in his life as the feeling or sense and taste of the infi nite (UR, 36) and later 
as the feeling of absolute dependence (CG, 16)?
3. THE HERMENEUTICAL IMPORT OF SCHLEIERMACHER’S PHILOSOPHY
In light of the questions considered above, the hermeneutical import of Schleier-
macher’s philosophy can be unfolded in at least three ways. These will be explored 
in the next three sections.
i.
Schleiermacher’s lectures and writings on ethics, politics and society indicate the 
fundamental importance of sociability and communication.26 As Dilthey, Gunter 
Scholtz, and James Brandt have argued, ethics is the basic motive and concern of 
Schleiermacher’s intellectual endeavors.27 In particular, his account of the sociality 
of human life should be the orienting point for considering the hermeneutical sig-
nifi cance of his works. Communication is not oriented toward correctness—as the 
identity of saying and what is said or between the mental states of speakers—or 
the integrating ideas of mediation or consensus as Gadamer or Habermas have 
articulated it. Communication is not exhausted in communication about the gen-
eral and universal, communication is the enactment, exhibition, and performance 
of individuality in language. I am claimed by the speech of others and respond 
by communicating who I am (compare UR, 5). It follows that communication 
is not only a discussion of objects or of what from a third-person perspective. 
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Communication concerns the fi rst person singular and plural. That is, the ques-
tion of who speaks and is spoken to. In asking who rather than what, one can 
appropriately answer through a name or personal pronouns such as “I” or “you.” In 
addressing and in being addressed as “who,” communication is already inherently 
interpersonal and ethical. The psychological dimension of hermeneutics, since it 
suggests interpretive rather than explanatory psychology, refers to the question 
who. The question of the who demands an articulation of singularity, a singular-
ity that defi es full disclosure. For Dilthey, this difference in language—i.e., the 
difference between the fi rst and third person perspectives—is what distinguishes 
lived-experience (Erlebnis) from experience (Erfahrung).28
The decentering of the modern idea of the subject was already at work in a mod-
ernist such as Schleiermacher when he emphasized the fundamental receptivity 
and dependence of the self. The decentering of the subject, as understood through 
certainty and autonomy, does not eliminate but radically opens up the question of 
the who as someone other than constituting or constituted. Thus, Schleiermacher 
can discuss the co-constitution or, in Heidegger’s language, equiprimordiality of 
self and world, self and other, in the opening chapters of The Christian Faith. This 
epistemological point is closely related to the ethical point that we can only become 
who we are through others (CG, 18). In both his early and late work, language has 
claimed us. We are claimed not only by an absolute dependence on God, but by a 
plurality of others on whom we are relatively dependent.
In his addresses On Religion, communication provides the opportunity for 
recognizing the positive character of actual beliefs and practices in their varia-
tion and plurality. Religious faith presents individuality in relation to infi nity or 
individuality as absolute dependence. Religious faith is not simply a matter of 
reproducing the thought and feeling of another, nor does it mean that an agree-
ment has to be achieved that would eliminate the differences between individuals 
and their respective perspectives. These differences are given a positive and 
necessary character, such that they are neither accidental to religion nor to be 
overcome in the unity of one religious belief or institution. This recognition of 
the fundamental plurality of religious life is what calls forth communication and 
is a goal of a communication oriented toward being receptive to others from out 
of their own perspectives. The recognition of religious difference is thus itself 
essential to religious understanding.
ii.
The ethical demand implicit in communication can be articulated from Schlei-
ermacher’s concern for individuality and infi nity, especially in On Religion 
and in the Monologues. Individuality and infi nity as positive phenomena are 
not only the limits of communication and hermeneutics but are their goal and 
motivation. Communication is therefore not the overcoming of individuality in 
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common life but it is its presentation in forms of speech that cannot be reduced 
to the universality of propositions and concepts.
An enactment of my individuality in relation to what I am and my context 
can occur, for example, in testimony and witnessing. Testimony can present the 
life of religious feeling and community. It is the articulation of the singularity of 
myself, others and God. This singularity is communicated, although it is not a 
particular that can be subsumed under or deduced from a universal. Such a form 
of communication addresses and responds rather than explains or convinces. 
Only such forms of communication can begin to be adequate to that which resists 
and escapes ourselves, our theories, concepts and propositions. Through speech 
such as testimony we indirectly indicate that which cannot be made explicit or 
mastered. We suggest through such communication that which cannot be com-
municated. These traces are suggested in experiences of individuality, the infi nity 
of a whole that withdraws from attempts to achieve systematic totality.
According to Schleiermacher, there is a divine excess that destroys uniformity 
and homogeneity, whereas the desire for system rejects what is foreign including 
the excess of the divine (UR, 44). Schleiermacher thus suggested that if there 
were only a fi nite world of confl ict and destruction, then the singular would 
be lost. Schleiermacher argued, perhaps paradoxically from the perspective of 
contemporary French philosophy, for the singular by way of an infi nite whole 
that would preserve the singular precisely in its singularity. Schleiermacher 
could thus claim that “everything is one and everything is true” and that this is 
precisely the condition of singularity, of unlimited difference, and plurality (UR, 
44). Relational context (Zusammenhang), as developed in Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey, would allow for a holism that requires the singular and an individualism 
that requires the whole.
iii.
Schleiermacher remained committed to the articulation of the importance of in-
dividuality and infi nity in his later theological writings such as in The Christian 
Faith. Schleiermacher is concerned in this work and in On Religion, especially 
with the concluding address, with the truth of a positive religion called Christian-
ity. Like Kant in Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason, Schleiermacher 
located the uniqueness of Christianity in its being a religion of redemption or 
salvation. For Kant, Christianity is a symbol of hope and the possibility of a 
revolution in moral attitude or character. 29 Its justifi cation is ethical. For Schlei-
ermacher, religion can only receive its own immanent justifi cation. He placed 
the particularity of Christian faith in the feeling of redemption that qualifi es the 
feeling of absolute dependence (OG, 70).
Although for Schleiermacher—as an elder, pastor, and theologian of the 
Reformed church who supported ecumenical reunion with the Lutheran church—
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Protestant Christianity best fulfi lls the feeling of absolute dependence in the 
doctrine of salvation by grace alone,30 his privileging of Reformed Christianity is in 
tension—if not confl ict—with his assertion of religious pluralism. Most problem-
atic is his use of developmental stages (in order: animism, polytheism, monotheism; 
Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and Protestant Christianity). Interestingly, Dilthey 
(Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical successor) criticized the use of such explanatory 
schemas in the human sciences and argued that Schleiermacher misunderstood 
and undermined historicity in using such a developmental schema.31 One should 
also keep in mind the uses that such developmental schemas and orientalism 
were put to in justifying European colonialism. Orientalism constitutes the East 
as surpassed and decayed origin that is in need of Western deliverance.32
Nevertheless, all religions embody and express truth. Schleiermacher argued 
that every religion in one way or another is an interpretation and embodiment 
of this feeling of dependence. Schleiermacher rejected the enlightenment idea 
of a natural or universal religion, including its Kantian moral form, because it 
suppresses the particularity of religious feeling and communication. To be reli-
gious is to belong to a particular positive religion (OG, 42). The articulation of 
a particular positive religion requires the recognition of a singular that cannot 
prove but can claim universality only insofar as it is one way of presenting and 
enacting the infi nite.33
Gianni Vattimo, in his essay on the return to religion in contemporary thought, 
entitled “The Trace of the Trace,” points out that this return is inherently con-
nected with the concept of positivity in a double sense: (1) as historicity and 
(2) as facticity.34 Positive religion would then be, according to the fi rst sense, a 
historical determination of that which is outside history. Since we cannot directly 
or purely access the holy, we can only do so through the positivity of a particular 
religion in a particular time and place for Schleiermacher. Still the positivity of a 
particular religion is bound to the facticity of religious experience itself. Absolute 
dependence suggests the facticity of a fi nite being in relation to the infi nite and the 
holy. Vattimo can thus claim “that the bare fact of returning denotes positivity as 
a constitutive feature of religion, in as much as religion depends on an originary 
facticity [italics mine, translation altered] that happens to be legible as created-
ness and dependence (in Schleiermacher’s sense perhaps)” (Vattimo, 1998, 85). 
This is a crucial point because religion does not simply demand commitment 
because it is a custom or convention of a particular society (i.e., because it is 
positive). Instead positive religion with all of its customs, conventions, and institu-
tions is how that which is outside all positivity and historicity is determined and 
interpreted. Positive religion is the explication, both necessary and without end, 
of factical religion. This positivity is infi nitely referred to the facticity of religious 
experience itself, which following Schleiermacher is a feeling of the infi nite and, 
more precisely, the feeling of absolute dependence.
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Karl Barth confuses facticity with factuality, historicity with history, in his 
critique of Schleiermacher, since he does not recognize in the factical and the 
historical anything but factual data that is nothing more than “reality and only 
reality” (Barth, 172) and “the burden of [theology’s] own historicity and relativity, 
of the inadequacy of all human words” which theology needs to overcome (Barth, 
176). Yet, for Schleiermacher, the sense of religion and the religious sense are 
not exhausted in positive religions or their scientifi c study. Religion is not only 
an object of study but an activity of passivity, since it is the feeling of absolute 
dependence. The fundamental mood or attunement (Stimmung) of religion is 
accordingly responsiveness in the acknowledgment of this absolute dependence. 
In the feeling of absolute dependence, Schleiermacher points out how the recep-
tivity fundamental to our being is spoken to or addressed (“anspricht”) in faith 
(CG, 19). As addressed, we are attuned (bestimmt) or called to respond from out 
of our receptivity. This fundamental receptivity is a being moved by something 
other than oneself. A positive religion differs from the positivity or factuality of 
other existing phenomena such as the state insofar as it calls forth a receptivity 
to that which is other than oneself, to God as the word that indicates that which 
cannot be named, to God as the infi nite and the holy.35 It is, in the language of 
Levinas, an absolute otherness or alterity since participation does not imply that 
I can assume comprehension of or identity with God. God can be thought of as 
either absolute alterity or absolute identity, but we are not in the position to think 
with Hegel the identity of identity and difference.
This argument is not uncontroversial. Karl Barth disparaged Schleiermacher’s 
claim that the word of God is related to the unnamable—or that saying is con-
ditioned by the unsayable—for two reasons: (1) if something is truly ineffable, 
the best response is to be silent, and (2) faith in the word of the Lord eliminates 
any reason to speak of the unknowable (Barth, 176). Barth thus rejected both 
interpretation and the ineffable because of the word, whereas Schleiermacher 
justifi ed them through the word. Their disagreement rests on the nature of lan-
guage—i.e., on whether the word is fi xed via the intention of the absolute author 
or whether language is an event in which the human and non-human, the sayable 
and the unsayable intersect.
Religion is thus underway to the feeling of absolute dependence on something 
other than oneself, yet it still indicates and singles out the self that is in ques-
tion in this very relation. According to Schleiermacher, absolute dependence on 
something other than one’s own self (in all its self-interest) is possible only in 
there being a self. Further, absolute dependence can only be dependence on one 
being and thus implies monotheism. This appeal includes the demand for the 
recognition of my dependence on other beings as well as that which is inadequately 
understood when we call it a being. Religion, as an originary facticity, is the con-
dition of openness, of receptivity and responsivity. These do not remain simply 
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mute but call forth our joys and sorrows to come to expression and action. They 
demand a communication of self and other because one cannot do otherwise 
than enact the response that one is to the infi nite and holy as it takes form in the 
singularity of absolute dependence and the particularity of a positive religion.
One might ask at this point: does the fi nitude of our knowledge in relation 
to infi nity delivers us into the evil of irrationality? According to Schleiermacher, 
acknowledging limits to knowledge does not mean to abandon knowledge. The 
recognition of limits to knowledge indicates instead the task for faith. This faith 
does not embrace the negative and irrational, it attempts to know and clarify itself. 
This faith does not allow questioning to stop in the face of a mystery. Rather, it is 
the pursuit of knowledge in the recognition that this self-refl ective faith cannot 
be established as a science. The fi nitude of knowledge does not therefore deliver 
us into the irrational but compels us to a refl ection that need not be a universal 
knowing. Instead we are open to the particular and the singular and these call 
us forth to communication.
This point can be made in another way by paraphrasing the conclusion of 
Karl Jaspers’ Der philosophische Glaube, a work that parallels Schleiermacher’s 
insistence on the need for communication in relation to an infi nite whole (the 
encompassing): We understand today, in our lack and need (Not), that communi-
cation fundamentally claims and addresses us. The clarifi cation of communication 
out of its plural origins in the modes of the encompassing (Umgreifende) is a 
central theme of philosophy and it is a daily task of philosophical life to bring 
closer all the possibilities of the realization of communication.36
4. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR A RESPONSIVE HERMENEUTICS
In the proceeding thoughts we fi nd an alternative way of thinking about what is 
essential to hermeneutics. In reading Schleiermacher’s works we can articulate 
indications of the positive character of difference, of the individual in its singular-
ity, of infi nity and that which addresses us without our being able to determine it. 
Despite the limits of Schleiermacher’s philosophy and hermeneutics, we can work 
from this basis in order to consider the implications of individuality, infi nity, and 
responsivity (which present us with the limits of knowing and understanding) 
for the articulation of the aims of knowledge and understanding in the arts of 
dialectic and hermeneutics.
Instead of seeking to eliminate the singular in its infi nity, that which escapes 
understanding, because it does not understand it, understanding can enact and 
speak of its relation to the unthought and the unthinkable. The experience of the 
ineffable suggests the task of a responsiveness without end, a task that does not 
eliminate the question of difference in demanding the exclusive and determinate 
universality of a supposed correctness or consensus, but allows us to respond to 
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the occurrence of the infi nite, the individual, and the holy. This appeal cannot be 
made without the demand for universality that is essential to the articulation of the 
singular. The singular is not a mere singularity, but a relation between the universal 
and the unique or the distinctive. Because of this demand of recognition, this ap-
peal constitutes an occurrence that cannot help but require the ethical response and 
responsibility of unfolding our own and others’ individuality and community.
In communication with others we are already in relation to the infi nite, which 
breaks through the fi nite immanence of the meanings and projects of the “I” or 
“we.” The infi nity and dependence indicated in faith is tied to our openness to our 
dependence on others and their singularity. In communication we are therefore 
spoken to and claimed by the other to whom we must respond. In feeling, we can 
be spoken to in and through faith, by that which calls me to further refl ection out 
of exposure to the unique and in the trace of the ineffable.37
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